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Abstract
Participation of women on corporate boards is increasing across the globe. Corporate with women
directors on their board are more likely to address the emerging strategic issues of climate change,
enhance GHG emission disclosure strategy and communicate the actions to the stakeholders.
According to Board Capital Theory, the presence of women on boards increases board capital breadth
in different dimensions. According to Critical Mass Theory, boards with three or more female
directors tend to influence the board’s decision-making process which results in more favourable
environmental disclosure. Findings of earlier studies reiterate that female executives and directors
bring different ethical values and traits to decision-making. This paper studies the effect of women on
board on climate change reporting to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) by the large Indian
companies. The sample for this study includes S&P BSE 100 indexed companies and the period of the
study is 6 years ranging from 2010-11 to 2015-16. This study used secondary data. The CDP data
and financial data are taken from Bloomberg Professional Database. Based on the items disclosed by
companies for CDP questionnaire, a Carbon Disclosure Index is constructed and used in this study.
Using a multiple regression model, it is found that there is a significant positive relationship between
the percentage of women directors on boards and climate change-related disclosure to CDP. Using
independent ‘t’ tests, it is found that companies having at least three women directors disclose more.
Thus, this study supports both board capital theory and critical mass theory.
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Keywords: Carbon Disclosure Project, Women on Board, Board Capital Theory, Critical
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1. INTRODUCTION
Socio-economic change has led women to occupy many roles including roles on company
boards and their share of professional and managerial positions in corporate has increased. In
order to bring greater gender diversity in corporate boardrooms, several countries have
chosen either to regulate the desired levels of diversity or to introduce voluntary targets for
companies. Many countries across Europe, Asia-Pacific and Africa have implemented some
form of mandate or target to have a certain percentage of women on the board of companies.
The trend started after Norway introduced a mandate requiring at least 40 per cent of the
board of listed companies to comprise women in 2006. In Europe, regulatory intervention is
believed to have largely spurred by a significant increase in the proportion of women
directors on boards, at times contributing to a growth of 100 per cent or more between 2011
and 2015. European Union and the State of California in USA have come up with regulations
specifying fixed number of women as board members. India is a $2.948 trillion economy
(World Economic Outlook Database, April 2018). It is currently the 6th largest in the world
in terms of Gross Domestic Product. The Companies Act, 2013 and guidelines issued by
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) made it mandatory for all listed companies
and every public company, having paid-up share capital of not less than Rupees one hundred
crore or turnover of Rupees three hundred crore or more, to have at least one woman on their
boards, either as an executive or a non-executive director. This study examines impact of the
presence of women directors on climate change-related disclosure made by large Indian
companies to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP).
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1. International Regulatory Developments
2.1.1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an
international environmental treaty adopted in the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
The objective is to control the Greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. The
framework sets non-binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions for individual countries and
contains no enforcement mechanisms. The framework outlines how specific international
treaties (called "protocols" or "agreements") may be negotiated to specify further action
towards the objective of the UNFCCC. There are two important agreements developed under
this framework viz., a) Kyoto Protocol and b) Paris Climate Agreement. (UNFCCC, 2015).
2.1.2. Kyoto Protocol
Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997 is an international agreement with an objective to
commit countries by setting internationally binding emission reduction targets. The Kyoto
Protocol is an important step towards a global emission reduction regime that would stabilize
GHG emissions. It was entered into force in February 2005. A total of 192 parties, including
the European Union, have signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The first commitment
period of the Kyoto Protocol is from 2008 to 2012. The Doha agreement in 2012 extended
the second commitment period from 2013 to 2020. The Kyoto Protocol (that lapses in 2020)
is the existing climate change agreement that will be replaced by the Paris Agreement in 2020
(What is the Kyoto Protocol, n.d.).
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2.1.3. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are 17 global goals set by the United Nations
General Assembly in 2015. The SDGs cover social and economic development issues, and it
lists Gender Equality and Climate Actions as two major goals to be attained by 2030 (UNDP
2015).
2.1.4. Paris Climate Agreement
The Paris Agreement is a global treaty to limit climate change, which was negotiated
in 2015. After signing the agreement, the ratification of the agreement takes place by
competent authorities in each of these countries. Signing shows the ‘intention’ of countries to
take steps to ratify the agreement in due course. Unlike the signing process, which is open
only until April 21, 2017, there is no specific deadline for ratification. As in March 2018,
there are 197 signatories to the Paris Agreement and 175 countries ratified it. India signed
and ratified both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris agreement. The Paris Agreement on
Climate Change, 2015 necessitates companies to be more focus on actions on climate change
mitigation and adaptation (UNFCCC, 2015).
2.1.5. Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP)
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is an organisation based in the United Kingdom which
supports companies and cities to disclose the environmental impact of major corporations. It
aims to make climate change reporting and risk management a business norm, and drive
disclosure, to promote action towards a sustainable economy. Companies all over the world
report their climate-related information through CDP (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2017).
2.1.6. Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure
Financial Stability Board (FSB) formed the Task Force on Climate-related Financial
Disclosures (TCFD) after G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors asked the FSB
to convene public and private sector participants to review how the financial sector can take
account of climate-related issues. In the course of its work, the TCFD reviewed existing
disclosure frameworks, consulted with a wide range of stakeholders and tapped into the deep
expertise of its members. In June 2017, the TCFD published its final report,
Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD
Recommendations). The Recommendations has four themes, such as governance, strategy,
risk management, and metrics and targets. These overarching areas are supported by 11
specific disclosure recommendations (Recommendations of the Task Force on Climaterelated Financial Disclosures, 2017).
2.2. Regulatory Developments in India
2.2.1. The National Voluntary Guidelines for the Social, Environmental and Economic
Responsibilities of Business (NVGs)
The NVGs were released by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs in 2009. It
is the product of an intensive multi-stakeholder collaboration spanning three years and
involving contributions from a wide variety of stakeholders. The NVGs comprises of “9 Core
Principles” which address different aspects of business responsibility (such as environmental,
social and governance) and “48 Core Elements”, which are included alongside the core
principles to help guide businesses in adopting/integrating the NVGs into their operations. It
advocates that businesses adopt a holistic triple-bottom-line approach whereby financial
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performance can be harmonized with the expectations of society, the environment and the
many stakeholders it interfaces in a sustainable manner. (National Voluntary Guidelines,
2011).
2.2.2. Business Responsibility Reporting (BRR)
Business responsibility makes business balance profit-making activities with activities that
benefit society; it involves developing businesses with a positive relationship with the society
in which they operate. Followed by growing attention towards ESG reporting
by business, SEBI mandated BRR for top 100 BSE, and NSE listed companies to disclose
their Business Responsibility Practices through a report adhering to the NVG framework
from financial year 2012-2013. As per SEBI Regulation, 2015, the top five hundred listed
entities based on market capitalization (as on March 31 of every financial year) are required
to report BRR from FY 2016-17 (Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2012).
2.2.3. Companies Act 2013
In India, The Companies Act, 2013 made it mandatory for all listed companies to have at
least one woman on their boards, either as an executive or a non-executive director. The
Company, whether public or private, is mandated to appoint at least one-woman director if it
is i) a listed company whose securities are listed on any stock exchange, or ii) a company
having paid-up capital of Rupees one hundred crore or more, or a turnover of Rupees three
hundred crores or more (Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 2013).
2.2.4. SEBI Mandates the appointment of women directors
As per the provisions of Companies Act,2013, SEBI had mandated all listed companies to
have, at least, one-woman director on their Boards by October 1, 2014. Followed by the
recommendations of Kotak Committee on Corporate Governance, SEBI decided that there
should be at least one woman independent director in the top 500 listed entities by market
capitalisation by 2019 and at least one woman director in the top 1,000 listed companies by
2020 (Securities and Exchange Board of India, 2017).
2.3. Studies on Measuring Carbon Emission Disclosure to CDP
Kolk, Levy and Pinkse (2008) studied the development of GHG emission reporting
mechanisms and corporate responses to climate change. The study found that CDP uses
institutional investors to urge to provide information about their climate change activities
from companies. Freedman and Jaggi (2011) studied whether disclosures on global warming
by companies from the European Union are more extensive than disclosures by Japanese and
Canadian firms. Disclosures made on annual reports, social, environmental and sustainability
reports, websites, and Climate change disclosure to CDP by 282 of the largest firms from
these countries were utilized for content analysis to measure their disclosures. The study
found that EU firms make significantly less global warming disclosures than firms from
Japan or Canada. Thus, the study identified that regulatory disclosure requirements could be a
good tool to improve disclosures.
Gallego-Álvarez, Rodríguez-Domínguez and García-Sánchez (2011) studied voluntary GHG
emissions disclosures to the CDP by the US S&P 500 companies. The study, using content
analysis and disclosure index, found that even though many firms answered the
questionnaire, but they did not disclose their emission amounts or how they account for them.
Stanny (2012) studied voluntary GHG emission disclosures by US S&P 500 companies to
CDP. Disclosure on answering the CDP questionnaire, disclosure on emissions and
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disclosure on accounting methodology adopted and their trends were examined from 2006 to
2008. The study found that the frequencies of all three disclosures increased over the study
period. The finding of the study is consistent with the legitimacy theory that firms will
disclose the minimum to avoid scrutiny. Previous disclosures are the most significant variable
in explaining subsequent disclosures, which suggests that there is a repetitive pattern in
disclosure.
Liesen, Hoepner, Patten and Figge (2015) measured the GHG emissions disclosure practices
of EU companies using corporate reports, websites and CDP reports from 2005 to 2009. The
study classified the reported data in terms of both scope and type of the emissions
information provided, as well as the reporting boundary applied to identify the completeness
of corporate disclosures on GHG emissions. The study found that only 15 per cent of
companies produced complete reports. Gonzalez-Gonzalez and Zamora Ramírez (2016) on
their study on determinants of voluntary carbon disclosure by Spanish companies, measured
transparency and quality of carbon reporting using the score obtained in the CDP
questionnaire. The study found that influence of pressures from society, markets,
shareholders and international interactions determine the voluntary carbon disclosures.
Blanco, Caro and Corbett (2017) studied carbon disclosure by 38 firms in seven countries
that disclose to CDP. The study found that more diverse benefits accrue to firms from the
measurement and disclosure process. Benefits can be both operational and strategic, and
internal as well as external. The study drew several implications for managers such as
precaution by the managers on biases related to investments in profitable emission reduction
opportunities. Giannarakis, Zafeiriou and Sariannidis (2017) in their study on whether
climate change disclosure reflects a firm's environmental performance, measured the level of
disclosure made by a sample of listed firms in FTSE 350 using Climate Performance
Leadership Index (CPLI) by CDP. CPLI is calculated by considering initiatives that
contribute to climate change mitigation, adaptation and transparency.
Kouloukoui, Gomes, Marinho, Torres, Kiperstokand and de Jong (2018) investigated the
climate risks disclosure by the 100 largest companies in the world. Using content analysis of
CDP and GRI reports, the study found that companies are at serious threat of facing
regulatory risks due to low level of disclosure. Information disclosed on climate change is not
mutually exclusive to the information disclosed on climate risks. De Faria, Andrade and da
Silva Gomes (2018) found that pollution prevention, loss prevention, environmental asset
management, GHG emissions and the strategy are the determinants mostly disclosed by
companies that are members of the Carbon Disclosure Project.
2.4. Studies on Board Diversity and Corporate Social Responsibility
Studies observed that the role of women in board positions is getting increased attention
(Daily C.M, Certoand Dalton, 2000), Singh, Terjesen and Vinnicombe (2008), Terjesen,
Sealy and Singh (2009). Hillman, Shropshire and Cannella (2007) observed that experiences,
perspectives, and values of women directors differ from men. Hillman, Cannella and Harris
(2002) and Helfat, Harris and Wolfson (2006) observed that women directors tend to possess
human capital that is inclusive of professional experiences in the fields of public and human
relations, which results in better stakeholder management. Studies by Hillman et al., (2007)
and Adams and Ferreira (2009) found that women on boards bring different perspectives and
experiences to the board and are more open to discussion of difficult issues. Bear, Rahman
and Post (2010), Wang and Coffey (1992) and Williams (2003) observed that firms with a
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greater proportion of women directors are more active in the areas of corporate philanthropy
and social responsibility.
Gul and Leung (2004) Studied the linkages between board structure in terms CEO duality and
voluntary corporate disclosure by Hong Kong listed companies and found that CEO duality is
associated with lower voluntary disclosure supporting the view that position of Chairman and
CEO should be separated.
Konrad, Kramer and Erkut (2008) studied the board diversity of fortune 1000 companies and
observed that boards have 9–12 members on average and when there are at least three women
members on board, they begin to constitute a numerically important minority. Social science
research has provided us with very few magic formulas for influencing people’s behaviour. In
the area of group dynamics, the number three seems to be pivotal. Similarly, in corporate
boards, the presence of three women or more on a board results in their having more
influence on board discussions through the critical mass effect. Lim, Matolcsy and Chow
(2007) studied the association between board composition and voluntary disclosure by
Australian companies. It is found that there is a positive relationship between both board
composition and voluntary disclosure; independent boards provided more voluntary
disclosure, and the structure of the board has no bearing on non-financial and financial
voluntary disclosure.
Nielsen and Huse (2010) studied the contributions of women on boards of directors of
Norwegian firms and found that the ratio of women directors is positively associated with
board strategic control. The positive effects of women directors on board effectiveness are
mediated through increased board development activities and through a decreased level of
conflict. The study found that women’s ability to make a contribution to the board may be
attributable to their different leadership styles. Bear et. al (2010) studied the impact of
biodiversity and gender composition on CSR and firm reputation and found that women
board members provide a broad range of contributions to boards. Boulouta (2013) studied the
link between Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Social Performance of companies from
S&P500 and found that board gender diversity significantly affects corporate social
performance. The study observed that promoting diversity in the boardroom is likely to
impact positively on the voluntary provision of holistic information and thus improve
stakeholder engagement.
Larkin, Bernardi and Bosco (2013) studied the association between the number of women
directors on a company’s board of directors and the company’s appearance on Ethisphere
Magazine’s “World’s Most Ethical Companies” list. The study found that having a higher
percentage of women on the board of directors of a Fortune’s 500 company is associated with
companies being included on the list of ethical companies. Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero and
Ruiz-Blanco (2014) studied whether the inclusion of at least three women on the board of
directors affects the levels and credibility of CSR disclosure. The study found that in
countries with a higher proportion of boards of directors with at least three women, the levels
of CSR reporting was higher. Countries with higher gender equality have more companies
with boards of directors with at least three women.
Al-Shaer and Zaman (2016) studied the effect of board gender diversity on sustainability
reporting quality and found that gender-diverse boards are associated with high-quality
sustainability reports, and independent female directors have greater effect on sustainability
reporting quality than other female directors. Sanan (2016) studied the impact of gender-wise
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heterogeneous boards on financial and social performance of Indian firms. The study used
Blau’s diversity index to capture gender diversity of the Board. The study could not establish
significant association between gender diversity of boards and financial and social
performance. Alazzani, Hassanein and Aljanadi (2017) studied the impact of gender diversity
on social and environmental performance in Malaysian context and found that there is a
significant positive association between social performance and the presence of female
directors on the board of directors. The study found no association between environmental
performance and the presence of female directors and thus concluding that the female
directors of Malaysian firms pay more attention to social issues than to environmental ones.
Katmon, Zuriyati, Norlia, Norwani and Farooque (2017) studied the relationship between
wide-ranging board diversity and the quality of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
disclosure variables in Malaysia and found significant positive association between gender
diversity and CSR disclosure, knowledge and experience of the board as well as the
placement of females on the board in improving a firm’s quality of CSR. Yasser, Al Mamun
and Ahmed (2017) studied the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and
Gender Diversity in firms across three Asia Pacific emerging economies viz Malaysia,
Pakistan, and Thailand using stakeholder and institutional theory. It found a significant
positive relationship between board gender diversity and enhanced adoption of CSR.
Sial, Zheng, Cherian, Gulzar,Thu, Khan and Khuong (2018) studied whether corporate social
responsibility reporting mediates the relationship between gender diversity in boards and firm
performance of Chinese listed companies. The study found that the existence of female
directors onboard improves firm performance. The study used Blau index (BI) to measure
board gender diversity and CSR reporting index to measure corporate social responsibility
reporting. Manita, Bruna, Dang and Houanti (2018) studied board gender diversity and
environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure. The ESG disclosure score provided
by Bloomberg is used as a proxy for the extent of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and
found significant relationship between board gender diversity and ESG disclosure. Pucheta‐
Martínez and Gallego‐Álvarez (2017) studied how independent and institutional women
directors on boards affect CSR reporting and found that the CSR disclosure improves when
presence of independent and institutional women directors on boards increases.
2.5. Studies on Women Directors and Climate Change Disclosure
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) introduced the concept of board capital in the strategic
management literature as the sum of the human and social capital of the board of directors. It
is a proxy for the board’s ability to provide resources to the firm. Board capital has two
dimensions – Breadth and Depth. The first dimension of board capital, ‘breadth,’ captures
various facets of the heterogeneity of the board such as education, functional background,
occupation, age, tenure, and the heterogeneity of industry ties through interlocks, or work
experiences in other industries. Board capital depth refers to the embeddedness of the board
in the focal firm’s industry. Industry embeddedness is a result of directors’ current or former
industry work experience, their horizontal or vertical ties to firms in the industry. Post,
Rahman and Rubow (2011) find that the boards with three or more female directors have
more favourable environmental disclosure strength scores, based on a sample of 78 electronic
and chemical companies on the Fortune 1,000 list of 2006 and 2007.
Post, Rahman and Mcquillen (2015) studied board composition and corporate environmental
performance and found that the representation of independent directors and women directors
on a firm’s board is positively associated with firm forming sustainability-themed alliances.
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Such alliances, in turn, positively contribute to corporate environmental performance.
Hollindale, Kent, Routledge and Chapple (2017) examined whether women on boards are
associated with disclosure and quality of corporate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions related
reporting using institutional and board capital theory. The study found that companies with
multiple female directors make higher quality GHG emissions related disclosures. Companies
with multiple women on the board have superior quantity and quality of GHG emission
related disclosure. Hossain, Farooque, Momin and Almotairy (2017) studied the relationship
between gender diversity and the Carbon Disclosure Project score. Specifically, the study
described extant research on theoretical perspectives, and the impact of women on corporate
boards on carbon emission issues in the global perspective. Using Carbon disclosure scores of
the CDP from 2011 to 2013, the study found a positive relationship between gender diversity
and carbon disclosure information.
Ciocirlan and Pettersson (2012) studied whether companies with more workforce diversity
are committed to the fight against climate change than less diverse companies. Sociodemographic dimensions such as age, gender, race are considered for the study. The study
found that companies that employ more women tend to exhibit a higher concern for climate
change. Management of GHG emissions is a relatively new strategic and ethical issue for
companies. Liao, Luo and Tang (2014) found that the presence of women on boards
increased the likelihood that the board understands the ethical and social demand of
providing meaningful and transparent disclosures regarding GHG emissions. This leads to
GHG emissions disclosures that are of higher quality. Ben-Amar, Chang and McIlkenny
(2017) studied the effect of women on board on stakeholder’s demand for greater climate
change-related disclosure using CDP reports. The study found that voluntary carbon
disclosure increases with percentage of women on board of directors.
3. RESEARCH GAP
Corporate climate change disclosure studies in the Indian context is in its nascent stage.
Corporate disclosure on other aspects such as corporate information through websites,
insurance disclosure, voluntary disclosure and CSR disclosure were studied in Indian context.
Charumathi and Surulivel (2009) studied the effectiveness of information disclosure of Indian
public sector banks on their websites, Charumathi and Nithya (2012) studied public
disclosure by Indian life insurers. Kota & Charumathi (2018) studied financial derivative
disclosure by Indian companies in the light of stewardship theory. Charumathi and Ramesh
(2013) studied voluntary disclosures by large Indian companies using content analysis of
annual reports, and Charumathi and Ramesh (2015) studied determinants of voluntary
disclosure by Indian companies. Charumathi and Padmaja (2018) studied the impact of
regulations and technology on corporate social responsibility disclosures by public sector
enterprises in India. Studies pertaining to the corporate disclosure on climate change are more
done in the context of developed countries which includes studies which measure the climate
change disclosure using a disclosure index. A notable study on climate change disclosure
done in India is Kumar and Firoz (2018) which studied the impact of climate change
disclosure on the financial performance of Indian companies. There are studies which
analysed the influence of women on board of directors on climate change-related disclosure
using samples from developed countries - both individual (Hollindale et al., 2017) and multicountries (Hossain et al., 2017; Ciocirlan and Pettersson, 2012). From developing countries,
very few studies are available. Sanan (2016) studied board gender diversity and financial and
social performance in the Indian context. Alazzani et al. (2017) analysed the impact of gender
diversity on social and environmental performance in the Malaysian context. No study has
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developed Carbon Disclosure Index (CDI) using Climate change disclosure to CDP and
analysed the influence of board characteristics on the same in the context of developing
countries. This study attempts to fill this gap.
4. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Climate change has become an important aspect of the sustainability of business, and the
climate change risk to business is alarmingly increasing. It is indeed an ethical issue which
needs to be dealt with to avoid dangerous consequences of climate change which causes
physical risks and transition risks (policy & legal risk, technology risk, market risk and
reputation risk) to the business (Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related
Financial Disclosures, 2017). There are individual level and organizational level explanations
for the lesser representation of women on boards. Individual-level explanations argue that
women are under-represented in senior management and on corporate boards because there is
a shortage of women with the requisite human capital. Organizational-level explanations can
be that male-biased expectations and requirements for success make it more difficult for
women to enter management and the top grades of many professional functions. According to
KPMG report, 2017, Norway is the country with 100% companies with at least one women
director, followed by US (87%), Germany (82%) Sweden and the UK (76%). With 27 % of
companies having at least one woman in the boards, India stands among countries with least
percentage. Further studies have proved that women on board will increase the likelihood of
carbon emission disclosures. In the light of the above information, it is essential to study
whether the board diversity, especially the number of women on board, would influence the
level of corporate climate change disclosure, as the management of GHG emission is a
relatively new strategic and ethical issue for companies.
5. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
Following are the objectives of the study:
1) To construct a Carbon Disclosure Index (CDI) using CDP climate change disclosure
to measure climate change disclosure by Indian companies using CDI.
2) To study the influence of the presence of women directors on the corporate board on
level of climate change disclosure to CDP.
6. VARIABLES OF THE STUDY
Table 1 shows the variables used for this study.
Table 1: Variables used in this study
Carbon Disclosure Index Score

Dependent Variable

a) Reporting Period
b) Risks and Opportunities
c) GHG Emissions
d) Energy Use
e) Trading
f) Targets and Initiatives
g) Governance and Strategy
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Independent Variables
Board Size

Control
Variables

Governance Variable

Board Meetings
Independent
Directors

Women Directors

CEO Duality
Energy
Consumption
Market
Capitalisation
Return on Asset

Definition & Purpose
Total number of directors on board on the last
date of the financial year.
The number of board meetings held in a
financial year
Number of independent directors/ Total
directors on the board as on the last date of the
financial year.
Number of women directors/ Total directors on
the board as on the last date of the financial
year.
CEO duality indicates the role of CEO and
chairman is held by the same person. It is a
dichotomous variable. Coded as 1 If CEO and
Chairman are different and 0 otherwise.
Natural Logarithm of total energy consumption
in a financial year.
Natural Logarithm of market capitalisation at
the end of each financial year.
Profit after tax/ Total asset.

Expected
Sign
+
+
+

+

-

+
+
+

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable considered for the study is the Carbon disclosure to CDP by sample
companies. This study has constructed a Carbon Disclosure Index to measure the level of
climate change disclosure. The index consists of sub-categories such as A) Reporting Period,
B) Risks and Opportunities, C) GHG Emissions, D) Energy Use, E) Trading, F) Targets and
Initiatives, and G) Governance and Strategy. The total score of CDI is taken as depended
variable.
Independent Variables
Independent variables chosen for the study include governance variables such as board size,
board meetings per year, Percentage of independent directors, Percentage of women directors
on board and CEO Duality.
Control Variables
Control variables chosen include energy consumption by the company, market capitalisation
as a proxy for firm size and Return on Asset as a proxy for profitability.
7. HYPOTHESES
This study tests the following null hypotheses:
H01: There is no significant company-wise difference in the level of climate change
disclosure to CDP during the study period.
H02: There is no significant year-wise difference in the level of climate change disclosure to
CDP during the study period.
H03: There is no significant sector-wise difference in the level of climate change disclosure to
CDP during the study period.
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H04: There is no significant difference in the level of climate change disclosure to CDP
between BSE Sensex companies and Non-BSE Sensex companies.
H05: There is no significant difference in the level of climate change disclosure to CDP
between before and after the introduction of mandatory BRR.
H06: There is no significant difference in the level of climate change disclosure to CDP
between before and after the introduction of Paris Agreement.
H07: There is no significant relationship between the level of climate change disclosure to
CDP and a) Board Size, b) Board Meetings c) Percentage of independent directors,
d) Percentage of Women on Board, e) CEO Duality, f) Energy Consumption, g)
Market Capitalisation, h) Return on Asset.
H08: There is no significant difference in the level of climate change disclosure to CDP
between companies having no women director and at least one women director on
their board.
H09: There is no significant difference in the level of climate change disclosure to CDP
between companies having three women directors and less than three women
directors.
8. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
8.1. Method
This is an empirical study.
8.2. Data – Nature, Source and Method of collection
The study used secondary data. Secondary data such as CDP disclosure data, financial and
governance data are collected from Bloomberg Professional database. The CDP reporting
status of sample companies is known from CDP database.
8.3. Sample
Publicly listed and constituents of S&P BSE100 companies as on 31 March 2017 are chosen
as the sample for this study. S&P BSE100 is a well-diversified 100 stock index accounting
for 10 different sectors. The CDP non-reporting companies were excluded. This resulted in
235 firm-year observations, based on the availability of CDP data. The number of companies
reporting and not reporting to CDP is shown in Table 2.

Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Total

Table 2: Sample
CDP Reporting Companies CDP Non- Reporting
Total
(Sample for this study)
Companies
35
65
100
36
64
100
37
63
100
42
58
100
42
58
100
43
57
100
235
365
600

Source: www.cdp.net
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8.4. Methodology for Constructing Carbon Disclosure Index (CDI)
This study constructs an index, viz., Carbon Disclosure Index (CDI). The index is
constructed from the CDP data available in the Bloomberg database. The CDP is an
organisation based in the United Kingdom which supports companies and cities to disclose
their environmental impact. It promotes carbon disclosure by publishing the reports based on
a questionnaire sent to companies around the globe. Bloomberg Professional database
features CDP climate change disclosure data by companies from various countries.
Table 3: Carbon Disclosure Index
Subcategories
No. of
Score
variables
4
4
A Reporting Period
6
6
B Risks and Opportunities
23
23
C GHG Emissions
10
10
D Energy Use
4
4
E Trading
2
2
F Targets and Initiatives
7
7
G Governance and Strategy
Carbon Disclosure Index
56
56
CDI Score
100%
Note: Developed by authors based on Climate change disclosure to CDP

Out of all items of climate change disclosure to CDP available in Bloomberg database, the
index constructed for this study, viz., CDI, has taken only the commonly reported items
consisting 56 reporting items under 7 broad categories such as a) Reporting Period, b) Risks
and Opportunities, c) GHG Emissions, d) Energy Use, e) Trading, f) Targets and Initiatives
and g) Governance & Strategy. The CDI in condensed version is shown in Table 3 and CDI
in a detailed version is given in Annexure 1.
The first subcategory ‘Reporting Period’ consists of disclosure in a reporting year such as
start date and end date of the CDP reporting year, CDP survey year and CDP reported fiscal
year. The second subcategory ‘Risk and Opportunities’ consists of disclosure on regulatory
risk exposure, physical risk exposure, other risk exposure, regulatory opportunities present,
physical opportunities present and other opportunities present. The third subcategory ‘GHG
Emissions’ consists of Scope 1 Emissions, Scope 2 Emissions, location-based and marketbased Scope 2 emissions, Scope 3 emission from sources such as use of sold produces and
products, Scope 3 investments, emissions from travel. Emissions of bio sequestered carbon
and verified emission data are included under the category of GHG Emissions. It includes
CH4 Emissions, N2O Emissions, HFC Emissions, PFC Emissions, Emissions NF3, SF6
Emissions. The fourth subcategory ‘Energy use’ include total fuel consumption, use of
biodiesels, biogas and crude oil, low carbon energy, total electricity consumption, total
purchased electricity consumption, total electricity production, total renewable electricity
produced, total production & consumption of renewable electricity, etc. The fifth subcategory
‘Trading’ includes information disclosure related to purchased allowances, trading
allowances, other compliance programs and carbon offsets. The sixth subcategory ‘Targets
and Initiatives’ includes company’s targets such as emission reduction targets and renewable
energy targets. The seventh subcategory ‘Governance and Strategy’ include disclosure
related to climate change mitigation governance and strategy by the company such as
incentives for management, policy on climate change, climate change strategy, internal price
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of carbon, third party avoided emissions, emission reduction activities and value chain
engagement.
CDP filing from the financial year 2010-2011 to 2015-2016 is taken for the analysis based on
data availability. While measuring the disclosure, each item of the index is given the same
weighting. A score of 1 is given for the disclosed items, and a score 0 is given for nondisclosed items. The total score is calculated and then converted into percentage by using the
formula
CDI Score = No of items disclosed in all categories / Total No. of items in CDI * 100

8.5. Period of the study
The study period is ranging from the financial year 2010-2011 to 2015-2016. Availability of
CDP reporting data was the criteria for choosing the period. The period witnessed increased
attention to climate change-related disclosure by the introduction of mandatory BRR in India
during 2012-2013 and the introduction of the Paris Climate Agreement during 2015-2016 at
the global level. The period also witnessed the introduction of the Companies Act 2013,
which mandates the appointment of at least one women director by every listed company and
every public company having paid-up share capital of not less than Rupees one hundred
crores or turnover of Rupees three hundred crores or more.
8.6. Statistical tools
Descriptive analysis is done for understanding the data. The study used ANOVA to find out
year-wise, company-wise and sector-wise differences in climate change disclosure. Multiple
linear regression is used to study the relationship between the presence of women on board
and the level of climate change-related disclosure.
Independent ‘t’ test is used to find the disclosure differences based on grouping
variables such
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Listing status in S&P BSE Sensex 30, i.e., i) indexed and ii) non-indexed companies
Business Responsibility Reporting period, i.e., i) before and ii) after BRR
Paris Agreement Period, i.e., i) before and ii) after the Paris Agreement
Presence of women director, i.e., i) with and ii) without women directors on board
Presence of more women directors, i.e., i) three and ii) less than 3 directors on board

8.7. Software used
Microsoft Excel and IBM SPSS 25.0 are used for data analysis.
8.8. Research Model
The research model used for the study is as follows:
CDI Score =Β0 +Β1 Board Size + Β2 Board Meetings + Β3 Independent Directors+
Β4 Women on Board + Β5 CEO Duality + Β6 Energy Consumption +
Β7 Market Capitalisation + Β8 Return on Assets + εi
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9. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
9.1. Level of Climate Change Disclosure
Table 4: Level of Climate Change Disclosure to CDP
- Descriptive Statistics
N
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
SD
2011
35
0.000
42.857
28.877
13.196
2012
36
0.000
44.642
30.009
12.147
2013
37
0.000
44.642
30.308
13.064
2014
42
0.000
46.428
31.887
12.299
2015
42
0.000
53.571
36.011
9.0188
2016
43
0.000
78.571
49.086
27.032
Note: Figures are in percentage; Results computed using SPSS 25.
Table 4 gives descriptive statistics of the level of climate change disclosure to CDP by
sample companies from 2011 to 2016. It is evident from the table that there are companies
with zero disclosure score during the study period. The maximum score for a company was in
2016 with score 78.571%. It is also evident that there is an increasing trend in the level of
climate change disclosure to CDP from 2011 to 2016.
Table 5: Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha
No. of Items
0.896
235
Note: Results computed using SPSS 25.
The reliability of the index was calculated. Table 5 depicts the reliability statistics. The value
of Cronbac’s alpha is 0.896. As the value is more than 0.8, the index is reliable.
9.2. Company-wise, Year-wise and Sector-wise differences in the Level of Climate
Change Disclosure to CDP
H01: There is no significant company-wise difference in the level of climate change
disclosure to CDP during the study period.

H02: There is no significant year-wise difference in the level of climate change disclosure to
CDP during the study period.

H03: There is no significant sector-wise difference in the level of climate change disclosure to
CDP during the study period.
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Table 6: Company-Wise, Year-wise and Sector-wise ANOVA
Company-Wise ANOVA
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
Between Companies
35224.693
51
690.680
3.693
Within Companies
34228.954
183 187.043
Total
69453.647
234
Year-Wise ANOVA
Between Years
11994.133
5
2398.827
9.560
Within Years
57459.514
229 250.915
Total
69453.647
234
Sector-wise ANOVA
Between Sectors
6445.065
8
805.633
2.890
Within Sectors
63008.582
226 278.799
Total
69453.647
234

Sig.
.000

.000

.004

Note: Results computed using SPSS 25.

Table 6 gives the results on company-wise, year-wise and sector-wise differences in the level
of climate change disclosure based on ANOVA. As the p-value is less than 0.05, the null
hypotheses, H01, H02 and H03 are rejected at the 1% level of significance. Thus, there is
significant company-wise, year-wise and sector-wise differences in the level of climate
change disclosure to CDP among the sample companies during the study period. Post Hoc
for years was categorised into 2 homogeneous subsets. The CDI scores from years from 2011
to 2015 are homogeneous, but the CDI scores for 2016 categorised into a different mean
group which has higher mean score compared to the first group due to introduction of Paris
agreement. Post Hoc test for sectors was categorised into 3 homogeneous subsets. The
Energy sector has the least mean CDI score, and the Utilities sector has the maximum mean
CDI score. The difference in the level of disclosure can be attributed to the non-disclosure of
climate change-related information by the Energy sector as their operations lead to more
carbon emission than other sectors.

9.3. Difference in the level of Climate Change disclosure to CDP by Sensex and NonSensex Companies
H04: There is no significant difference in the level of climate change disclosure to CDP
between BSE Sensex companies and Non-BSE Sensex companies.
Table 7: Results of Independent Samples Test –
Differences in CDI Scores among Sensex and non-Sensex companies
Sensex
Non-Sensex
Levene’s
Equal
Equal
Companies
Companies
test for
Variances Variances
(N=90)
(N=145)
Equality Assumed
not
Variable
of
Mean
Std.
Mean
Std.
(Sig.)
Assumed
Variances
Dev
Dev
(Sig.)
(Sig.)
CDI

34.345

17.847

35.061

16.889

Note: Results computed using SPSS 25.

19

0.244
(0.622)

0.757

.761

AABFJ | Volume 13, no.2, 2019

Table 7 shows the results of independent t-test for BSE Sensex companies and non-Sensex
companies. It is evident that the mean CDI score for Sensex companies is at 34.345, and that
of non-Sensex companies is at 35.061. The F value stands at 0.244, with a significance value
of 0.622. Since the p-value is at 0.622 for Levene’s test, equal variances assumed column is
considered. Base on the p-value, the null hypothesis, H04, is accepted. Thus, there is no
significant difference in the level of climate change disclosure to CDP between BSE Sensex
companies and Non-BSE Sensex companies.
9.4. Level of Climate Change Disclosure to CDP after BRR

H05: There is no significant difference in the level of climate change disclosure to CDP
between before and after the introduction of mandatory BRR.
Table 8: Results of Independent Samples Test Differences in CDI Scores before and after BRR
Before BRR
After BRR
Levene’s
Equal
Equal
(N=71)
(N=164)
test for
Variances Variances
Equality Assumed
not
Mean
Std.
Mean
Std.
Variable
of
(Sig.)
Assumed
Dev
Dev
Variances
(Sig.)
(Sig.)
29.4517 12.5975 37.0971 18.443
4.325
0.002
0.000
CDI
(0.039)
Note: Results computed using SPSS 25.
Business Responsibility Reporting was mandated by SEBI in FY 2012-13. Disclosure on
Environmental, Social and Governance aspects of business became mandatory to large-cap
companies. Independent samples ‘t’ test is used to measure the improvement in climate
change disclosure to CDP by Indian companies after the introduction of BRR. Table 8 shows
the results of independent t-test for the two different time periods 2011-2012 (before BRR)
and 2013-2016 (after BRR). It is evident that the mean CDI for 2011- 2012 is at 29.4517 and
that of 2013-2016 is at 37.0971. The F value stands at 4.325, with a significance value of
.039. Since the p-value is at .039 for Levene’s test, equal variances not assumed column is
considered. As the p-value in that column is less than 0.01, the null hypothesis, H05, is
rejected at 1% level of significance. Thus, there is a significant difference in the level of
climate change disclosure to CDP between before (2011-2012) and after (2013-2016) the
introduction of mandatory BRR. It can be construed that the introduction of mandatory BRR
has compelled the companies to make more climate change disclosure to CDP.
9.5. Level of Climate Change Disclosure to CDP after the Paris Agreement
H06: There is no significant difference in the level of climate change disclosure to CDP
between before and after the introduction of the Paris Agreement.
Table 9 shows the results of independent t-test for the two different time periods – before
(2010-11 to 2014-15) and after the introduction of the Paris Agreement (2015-16). It is
evident that the mean CDI for 2011- 2015 is at 31.584 and that of 2016 is at 49.0863. As the
F value stands at 65.766 with a significance value of 0.000for Levene’s test, equal variances
not assumed column is considered. As the p-value in that column is less than 0.01, the null
hypothesis, H06, is rejected at 1% level of significance. Thus, there is no significant difference
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in the level of climate change disclosure to CDP between before and after the introduction of
the Paris Agreement. It can be construed that introduction of the Paris Climate Accord has
made the companies do more climate change disclosure to CDP.

Table 9: Results of Independent Samples Test Differences in CDI Scores before and after the Paris Agreement
Before Paris
After Paris
Levene’s
Equal
Equal
Agreement
Agreement
test for
Variances Variances
(N=192)
(N=43)
Equality Assumed
not
Variable
of
Mean
Std.
Mean
Std.
(Sig.)
Assumed
Variances
Dev
Dev
(Sig.)
(Sig.)
CDI

31.5848 12.1080 49.0863 27.0322

65.766
(0.000)

0.000

0.000

Note: Results computed using SPSS 25.
9.6. Influence of governance variables on Climate Change Disclosure to CDP
H07: There is no significant relationship between climate change-related disclosure and a)
H07a: Board Size, b) H07b: Board Meetings c) H07c: Percentage of independent
directors, d) H07d: Percentage of Women on Board, e) H07e: CEO Duality, f) H07f:
Energy Consumption, g) H07g: Market Capitalisation, h) H07h: Return on Asset.
Table 10 shows the regression results of the research model on the factors influencing
climate change disclosure to CDP. From the p-value, it is clear that the model is fit.
As the p-value is less than 0.10, the null hypothesis, H07c, is rejected at 10% level of
significance. As the p-value is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis, H07d, is rejected at 5%
level of significance. As the p-value is less than 0.0, the null hypothesis, H07g, is rejected at
1% level of significance. Thus, there is a significant positive relationship between climate
change disclosure to CDP and that of the percentage of independent directors, percentage of
women directors and market capitalisation. As the p-value is less than 0.05, the null
hypothesis, H07e, is rejected at 5% level of significance. Thus, there is a significant negative
relationship between CEO Duality on climate change disclosure to CDP.
As the p-value is less than 0.01, the null hypothesis, H07h, is rejected at 1% level of
significance. Thus, there is a significant negative relationship between Return on Asset on
climate change disclosure to CDP. Based on p-value, the null hypotheses, H07a and H07b, are
not rejected. Hence, there is no significant relationship between climate change disclosure
to CDP and that of board size and number of board meetings per year.
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Table 10: Regression results on the factors influencing Climate change disclosure to CDP
Model Summary
R

R Square

.437a

.191

Model

Sum of Squares

Regression
Residual
Total

6309.370
26667.944
32977.314

Model
(Constant)
Board Size
Board Meetings Per Year
Independent Directors (%)
Women on Board (%)
CEO Duality
LN Energy Consumption
LN Market Capitalisation
Return on Asset (ROA)

Adjusted R Square

.142
ANOVAa
df
Mean
Square
8
788.671
131
203.572
139
Coefficientsa
Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error

-35.533
.179
-.246
.219
.419
-7.381
.371
4.626
-.519

18.886
.521
.646
.131
.173
3.308
.568
1.462
.185

Std. Error of the Estimate

14.267869327253107
F

Sig.

3.874

.000b

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

.033
-.035
.151
.206
-.187
.058
.329
-.300

t

Sig.

-1.881
.344
-.382
1.680
2.419
-2.231
.654
3.164
-2.806

.062
.731
.703
.095*
.017**
.027**
.515
.002***
.006***

a. Dependent Variable: CDI Score
b. Predictors: (Constant), Board Size, Board Meetings Per Year, Independent Directors (%), Women on Board (%),
CEO Duality, LN Energy Consumption, LN Market capitalisation, ROA
***=Significant at 1 % level, **=Significant at 5% level, *=Significant at 10% level
Note: Results computed using SPSS 25

It can be construed that the presence of independent directors and women directors
influence the climate change disclosures as they view climate change as a strategic and
emerging ethical issue. Large companies disclose more climate change information as a)
their visibility compels them and c) they can also ensure board diversity. Profitable
companies disclose less as they have the advantage of ploughing profits back without
relying on market capital.
9.7. Level of Climate Change Disclosure to CDP with the presence of Woman Directors
on Board
H08: There is no significant difference in the level of climate change disclosure to CDP
between companies having no women director and at least one women director on
their board.
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Table 11: Results of Independent Samples Test
Differences in CDI Scores between companies with and without a woman on board
Levene’s
Equal
Equal
Companies
Companies with
test for
Variances Variances
without women
women directors
Equality
Assumed
not
directors
(N=153)
of
(Sig.)
Assumed
(N=73)
Variable
Variances
(Sig.)
Mean
Std.
Mean
Std.
(Sig.)
Dev
Dev
CDI

33.2191

13.9904

36.4729

18.1168

3.625
(0 .058)

0.177

0.140

Note: Result computed using SPSS 25.
Table 11 shows the results of independent t-test for CDI score by companies with women
directors and companies having no women directors. It is evident that the mean CDI for
companies with women directors at 33.2191 and that of companies having no women
directors is 36.4729. The F value stands at 3.625 with a significance value of 0.058 for
Levene’s test, equal variances assumed column is considered. Based on the p-value, the null
hypothesis, H08, is accepted. Thus, there is no significant difference in the level of climate
change disclosure to CDP between companies having no women director and at least one
women director on their board. It can be construed that the presence of one women director
on the board cannot influence the level of climate change disclosure to CDP.
9.8. Level of Climate Change Disclosure to CDP with the presence of three (Critical
Mass) Woman Directors on Board
H09: There is no significant difference in the level of climate change disclosure to CDP
between companies having three women directors and less than three women directors.
Table 12: Results of Independent Samples Test
Differences in CDI Scores between companies with less than 3 women on board and
3 women board
Companies with
Companies with
Levene’s
Equal
Equal
less than 3
3 women on
test for
Variances Variances
women on board
board
Equality Assumed
not
Variable
(N=140)
(N=13)
of
(Sig.)
Assumed
Variances
(Sig.)
Mean
Std.
Mean
Std.
(Sig.)
Dev
Dev
35.6250 18.2048 45.6043 14.8263
0.054
0.057
0.038
CDI
(0.816)
Note: Result computed using SPSS 25.
Table 12 shows the results of independent t-test for CDI score by companies with 3 women
directors and companies having less than 3 women directors. It is evident that the mean CDI
for companies with less than 3 women directors is at 35.6250 and that of companies having 3
women directors is 45.6043. As the F value stands at .054 with a significance value of 0.816
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for Levene’s test, equal variances assumed column is considered. As the p-value in that
column is less than 0.1, the null hypothesis, H09, is rejected at 10% level of significance.
Thus, there is no significant difference in the level of climate change disclosure to CDP
between companies having three women directors and less than three women directors.
10. MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
The following are the major findings of this study:
1. The climate change disclosure to CDP by Indian companies is increasing year after year
during the study period.
2. There is significant company-wise, year-wise and sector-wise differences in climate
change disclosure to CDP by Indian companies.
3. There is a significant improvement in the level of climate change disclosure to CDP after
the introduction of mandatory Business Responsibility Reporting in FY 2012-13 and
Paris Agreement in 2015.
4. Climate change disclosure to CDP is a) positively and significantly influenced by the
percentage of women directors, percentage of independent directors and market
capitalization CEO duality; and b) negatively and significantly influenced by CEO duality
and return on asset.
5. Presence of three-woman directors, viz., critical mass, on the board significantly
increased the level of climate change disclosure to CDP. Nevertheless, the presence of
only one woman on a board did not have any influence.

11. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The following are the limitations of this study:
a) The CDP climate change disclosure data are collected from Bloomberg database. The
limitations of secondary data apply to this study.
b) The study was conducted for a period of 6 years (from FY 2010-11 to 2015-16) only
due to non-availability of data.

12. SCOPE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
a) The present study considers only climate change disclosure to CDP. Future studies
can source climate change-related information from sources such as annual reports,
sustainability reports, business responsibility reports, integrated reports, and corporate
websites as these channels are also used for reporting climate change-related
information to stakeholders.
b) This study analysed the influence of women on boards on the level of climate change
disclosure to CDP. Future studies can be done on the quality of these disclosures.
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13. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
Rosener (1995) indicates, one woman on the board is often regarded as a token, two women
on the board might not be enough to influence the board’s decision process. Konrad et al.
(2008), Torchia, Calabrò and Huse (2011) and Joecks, Pull and Vetter (2013) argue that
women representation on boards needs to reach a ‘critical mass’ level before it can affect
boards’ decision-making and it is suggested that at least three women on boards constitutes a
critical mass (Konrad et al., 2008). The findings of this study revealed that the presence of
independent directors and women directors significantly and positively increases the climate
change disclosure to CDP by Indian companies. Hence, the Indian regulator (SEBI) should
enhance the legal requirements and mandate the companies legally to have more than one
female director (instead of the present legal requirement of having at least one woman
director as a practice of tokenism) to reach the ‘critical mass’. Further, women director can be
made as chairman of environmental and corporate social responsibility committees to handle
the new strategic and emerging ethical issues of climate change and social responsibility.
14. CONCLUSION
This study supports the previous studies on board capital theory (Ciocirlan and Pettersson,
2012; Ben-Amar et al., 2017; Hollindale et al., 2017; and Hossain et al., 2017) that
companies having women as board of directors tend to consider ethical aspects in decision
making, especially when it is related to stakeholders of the company. This study also
supports the previous studies on critical mass theory (Konrad et al. 2008; Torchia et al. 2011;
Joecks et al. 2013 and Ahmed, Monem, Delaney and Ng., 2017) that companies with three
women on board (critical mass) tend to influence decision making that results into ethical
decisions which in turn promote more disclosure and transparency. This study proved the
Board Capital Theory and Critical Mass Theory on appointing women to improve board
performance in reporting climate change disclosure to CDP in the Indian context. There is
more hope that regulators, based on the performance of woman directors, may increase the
number of woman directors on board than ever before.
________________
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Annexure 1– Carbon Disclosure Index (CDI)
Reporting Period
StartDate of CDP Reporting Year
End Date of CDP Reporting Year
CDP Survey Year
CDP Reported Fiscal Year
Risks and Opportunities
Regulatory Risk Exposure
Physical Risk Exposure
Other Risk Exposure
Regulatory Opportunities Present
Physical Opportunities Present
Other Opportunities Present
GHG Emissions
Scope 1 Activity Emissions Globally
CH4 Emissions (CO2e)
N2O Emissions (CO2e)
HFCs Emissions (CO2e)
PFC Emissions (CO2e)
Emissions NF3 (CO2e)
SF6 Emissions (CO2e)
Location-based Scope 2
Market-based Scope 2
Scope 2 Emissions
Revenue Emission Intensity
Company Selected Emission Intensity
Scope 3 Purch Goods/Services
Scope 3 Use of Sold Produces
Scope 3 Use of Sold Products
Scope 3 Investments
Emissions from Travel
Emissions of Bio Sequestered Carbon
CDP Level of Uncertainty Scope 1 Emissions
CDP Level of Uncertainty Scope 2 Emissions
CDP Percentage Data Verified Scope 1
CDP Percentage Data Verified Scope 2
CDP Percentage Data Verified Scope 3
Energy Use
Total Fuel Consumption
CDP Fuel Used - Biodiesels
CDP Fuel Used - Biogas
CDP Fuel Used - Crude Oil
Low Carbon Energy
Total Electricity Consumption
Total Purchased Elec Consumption
Total Electricity Production
Total Renewable Electricity Produced
Total Production & Consumption of Renew Electricity
Trading
Purchased Allowances (ETS)
Other Compliance Programs
Carbon Offsets
Trading Allowances (ETS)
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F
48
49
G
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Targets and Initiatives
Emission Reduction Targets
Renewable Energy Target
Governance and Strategy
Incentives for Management
Engages Policy Climate Change
Climate Change Strategy
Internal Price of Carbon
Third Party Avoided Emissions
Emission Reduction Activities
Value Chain Engagement
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